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PROVING CAUSE IN FACT UNDER WASHINGTON'S
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: THE CASE FOR A
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE
Jennifer Rust Murray
Abstract: Under Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA), parties must prove
proximate cause to prevail in a private cause of action for damages. Proximate cause requires
proof of cause in fact and legal causation. Traditionally, in a case in which a person has
disseminated an affirmative representation in an attempt to induce a consumer to purchase a
product, reliance provides evidence of cause in fact. Washington courts have not decided,
however, which party has the burden of proving or disproving reliance. They also have not
decided whether indirect proof of reliance is sufficient for proving cause in fact. This
Comment argues that Washington courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption of causation
in affirmative misrepresentation cases under the CPA on proof that a misrepresentation is
material, widely disseminated, and that the consumer bought the product following the
misrepresentation. The rebuttable presumption of causation best furthers the intent of the
legislature because it is the test that federal courts use, it protects consumers, and it does not
burden trade or commerce.
The Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) prohibits unfair or
deceptive acts in trade and commerce. t The CPA's purpose is to
complement federal law that protects consumers from the unfair acts of
businesses.2 In 1970, the Washington State Legislature authorized a
private cause of action under the CPA.3 To prevail on a private CPA
claim, a claimant must prove that the unfair or deceptive act or practice
proximately caused the claimant's injuries.4 Proximate cause requires
proof of two elements: cause in fact and legal causation. Proving cause
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2004). The CPA does not contain a definition of "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices." See Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A
Proposal to Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1621, 1621 n.1
(1983) [hereinafter Toward Greater Equality]. The author cites H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914)
for the idea that "it is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no
limit to human inventiveness in this field." Id.
2. See WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
3. Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection, ch. 26, sec. 2, § 9, 1970 Wash. Laws 203-04
(codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2004)).
4. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 314, 858 P.2d
1054, 1062 (1993).
5. See Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77, 82 (1985). This Comment adopts the
Hartley court's terminology, which defines "proximate cause" as the combination of "legal
causation" and "cause in fact."
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in fact, however, is very difficult in affirmative misrepresentation cases,
and requiring such proof often thwarts the purpose of consumer
protection statutes.6
Reliance traditionally provides proof of causation in an affirmative
misrepresentation case.7 However, Washington courts have not adopted
a uniform standard for proving cause in fact in cases where unfair or
deceptive acts induce consumers to act to their detriment.8 While some
courts require claimants to show that they relied on the defendant's
deceptive act,9 others require only evidence that an injury resulted from
a deceptive act.' 0 In 2001, the Washington State Supreme Court
acknowledged that Washington lacks a clear standard of proof for
causation and concluded that whether the CPA requires a showing of
reliance in cases of affirmative misrepresentation is "a debatable
question without a clear answer under Washington law.""
This Comment argues that Washington courts should not require strict
proof of reliance in a private CPA action in which the plaintiff claims
the defendant made an affirmative misrepresentation designed to induce
a sale. Instead, Washington courts should adopt the approach of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and allow a
rebuttable presumption of reliance on proof that (1) the
misrepresentation was material, (2) it was widely disseminated, and (3)
the consumer bought the product.' 2 Part I discusses the purpose of the
6. See FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993).
7. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 714 (4th ed. 1971).
8. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 196-98, 35 P.3d 351, 360
(2001) (noting that the court in the seminal case Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986), did not elaborate on the level of proof
required to show causation).
9. See, e.g., Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 414-15, 693 P.2d 697, 700-
01 (1985) (holding that where it cannot be shown that the noninsured relied upon the search and
disclosure of a title insurance company and that this reliance was foreseeable, no liability based on a
duty to search and disclose may be imposed); Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 111, 639 P.2d
832, 840 (1982) (holding that a party has not established a causal relationship with a
misrepresentation of fact where he does not convince the trier of fact that he relied on it).
10. See, e.g., Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 101 Wash. App. 901, 916-20, 6 P.3d 63,
70-72 (2000), overruled by 145 Wash. 2d 178 (2001) (holding that to show causation in a CPA case
the claimant must show only that the claimant lost money because of an unfair or deceptive
practice).
11. Pickett, 145 Wash. 2d at 197, 35 P.3d at 360.
12. See FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993). This Comment discusses only
affirmative misrepresentations designed to induce a sale and does not address the causation issue as
it relates to unfair conduct outside of the inducement context.
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CPA and describes the role that private causes of action play in
advancing that purpose. Part II establishes that the CPA requires proof of
causation to prevail in a private cause of action. Part III describes the
"rebuttable presumption of reliance" test used by federal courts in cases
decided under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Part IV
argues that Washington courts should adopt the approach of the Ninth
Circuit in Federal Trade Commission v. Figgie International, Inc.'3 and
presume causation in cases in which a business widely disseminated a
material misrepresentation and the consumer bought the product. 14 This
approach provides a clear test that honors the legislature's intent that the
CPA complement federal consumer protection law, furthers the CPA's
goal of protecting consumers, and does not burden trade and commerce.
I. THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED COURTS TO CONSTRUE
THE CPA IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL GOALS
Washington's state legislature enacted the CPA to further the goals of
federal consumer protection statutes like the FTCA, the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and the Clayton Act. 15 The legislature expressly advised
courts to construe the statute broadly and in conformance with federal
law in order to further the purpose of the federal acts at the state level.'
6
Moreover, the stated primary purpose of the CPA is identical to the
purpose of these federal statutes: to protect consumers from unfair and
deceptive practices without unreasonably restraining trade or
commerce. 17
13. 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993).
14. See id. at 605-06.
15. See Tradewell Stores, Inc. v. T.B. & M., Inc., 7 Wash. App. 424, 431, 500 P.2d 1290, 1295
(1972). The CPA's wording is nearly identical to that of the FTCA. Compare WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.020 (2004) ("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000)
("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.").
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
17. Id.; see also Wheeler Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (expressing a clear
intent that the Federal Trade Commission pursue trade practices that have a detrimental effect on
consumers); Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 674, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (prohibiting any contract or
conspiracy that restrains trade or commerce); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2002) (protecting trade
and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies); Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
ch. 311, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (combating uncompetitive behavior).
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A. The Washington State Legislature Modeled the CPA After Federal
Consumer Protection Statutes
In 1961, the Washington State Legislature enacted the CPA to
promote fair competition and protect consumers from deceptive or
misleading business practices.' 8 The legislature modeled the CPA after
the FTCA, which Congress originally adopted in 1914 to promote
competition in trade and commerce. 19 Congress revised the FTCA in
1938 to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts against consumers.20 In the
1960s, courts and commentators realized that traditional common law
remedies and federal regulation insufficiently protected consumers from
unfair or deceptive business practices. 21 The common law tort of deceit
and fraud required plaintiffs to prove that the defendant knowingly made
22a false statement with the intent to deceive. Because this made proving
fraud difficult, consumers did not have an adequate remedy against
deceptive businesses practices.23 The FTCA also did not provide
consumers with adequate protection because it did not authorize a
private cause of action. 4 For these reasons, the Washington State
Legislature enacted the CPA to complement the FTCA and provide for
broader enforcement of the FTCA at the state level.
18. Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection, ch. 216, § 2, 1961 Wash. Laws 1956
(codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2004)). The purpose of the CPA is to "protect the
public and foster fair and honest competition." Id. § 20, 1961 Wash. Laws 1964.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
20. See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 1, at 1621.
21. See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 1, at 1621.
22. See, e.g., Baertschi v. Jordan, 68 Wash. 2d 478, 482, 413 P.2d 657, 660 (1966). The court stated:
It is well-settled law in this state that in order to recover for fraud, the following must be
proved: (1) a representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its falsity; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted
on by the person to whom it is made; (6) ignorance of its falsity on the part of the person to
whom it is made; (7) the latter's reliance on the truth of the misrepresentation; (8) his right to
rely on it; (9) his consequent damage.
Id.
23. See William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TuL. L. REV. 724, 725
n.4 (1924) (discussing the inadequacy of common law tort remedies for deceptive trade practices).
24. See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 1, at 1621-22.
25. See Tradewell Stores, Inc. v. T.B. & M., Inc., 7 Wash. App. 424, 431, 500 P.2d 1290, 1295
(1972); see also Toward Greater Equality, supra note 1, at 1621-22 (noting that the FTC
encouraged states to provide consumers with a private cause of action against unfair or deceptive
acts).
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B. The CPA Expressly Advises Courts to Construe It in Accordance
with Federal Law
In keeping with the FTCA, the CPA expressly advises courts to
construe its language in accordance with federal law and the final orders
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).26 In the past, courts have taken
this advice seriously and have consistently followed federal precedent.2 7
By keeping state law consistent with federal law, the legislature intended
to "avoid subjecting Washington businesses to divergent regulatory
approaches to the same conduct., 28 Further, by advising courts to
construe the statute's language broadly in accordance with federal law,
the legislature provided guidance for courts faced with divergent
opinions on matters of state law.
2 9
C. The Legislature Authorized a Private Cause ofAction Under the
CPA to Further the Consumer Protection Goals of the Statute
The CPA requires plaintiffs to show that a claim affects the public
interest.30  Like the FTCA, Washington's CPA authorizes the
Washington State Attorney General to enforce the provisions of the CPA
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004). The statute states:
The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is to complement the body of
federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and
fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition.
It is the intent of the legislature that, in construing this act, the courts be guided by final
decisions of the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the
various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters and that in deciding whether
conduct restrains or monopolizes trade or commerce or may substantially lessen competition,
determination of the relevant market or effective area of competition shall not be limited by the
boundaries of the state of Washington. To this end this act shall be liberally construed that its
beneficial purposes may be served.
Id.
27. See Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 86 Wash. App. 782, 787, 938 P.2d 842, 846 (1997) ("The directive
to be 'guided by' federal law does not mean we are bound to follow it. But neither are we free to
ignore it, and indeed in practice Washington courts have uniformly followed federal precedent in
matters described under the Consumer Protection Act."); see also Short v. Demopolis, 103
Wash. 2d 52, 60-61, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (1984) (relying on federal law to determine whether the
practice of law occurs in trade and commerce).
28. Blewett, 86 Wash. App. at 788, 938 P.2d at 846.
29. See Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 59-60, 691 P.2d at 167-68 (resolving a state appellate court split by
looking to federal law); Ballo v. James S. Black Co., 39 Wash. App. 21, 26, 692 P.2d 182, 186
(1984) (adopting the tests used by federal courts to determine whether conduct violates antitrust
laws).
30. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 787, 719
P.2d 531, 536 (1986) (noting that Washington is "very clearly in the minority in requiring a public
interest showing of a private plaintiff').
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for the benefit of all Washington State consumers.31 In 1970, the
Washington legislature amended the CPA to provide for private causes
of action by individual consumers.32 The amendment allows successful
plaintiffs to recover attorney fees and treble damages,33 which makes
litigation affordable. The legislature intended the private cause of action
under the CPA to both provide a remedy for individual consumers and
help protect the general public from deceptive business practices.34 Thus,
courts have construed the statute to require private causes of action to
serve the public interest instead of merely providing a vehicle for
individual damage recovery.35
D. The Legislature Did Not Intend the CPA to Unreasonably Restrain
Trade
While the overall purpose of the statute is to protect consumers,36 the
CPA specifically limits courts' discretion to achieve that purpose.37
Courts cannot "prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation
to the development and preservation of business.' 38 Courts must balance
the interests of businesses in promoting trade and commerce with the
interests of consumers in fairness and honesty.39
In sum, the legislature enacted the CPA in order to complement
31. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (2004).
32. See Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection, ch. 26, § 2, 1970 Wash. Laws 203-04
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2004)).
33. See id.
34. See Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331, 334-35, 544 P.2d 88, 90.
It follows that an act or practice of which a private individual may complain must be one which
also would be vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General under the act. A breach of a
private contract affecting no one but the parties to the contract, whether that breach be
negligent or intentional, is not an act or practice affecting the public interest.
Id.
35. See Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 787-88, 719 P.2d at 536-37. Washington is one of the
few states that require private claimants to prove that their claims affect the public interest. Id.
36. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
37. Id. The statute states:
It is, however, the intent of the legislature that this act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or
practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business or
which are not injurious to the public interest, nor be construed to authorize those acts or
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or are unreasonable per se.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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federal consumer protection law.40  To that end, the legislature
specifically advised courts to interpret the CPA in accordance with
federal law.4' Courts should therefore protect the interests of consumers
42without stifling trade and commerce.
II. THE CPA REQUIRES PROOF OF CAUSATION IN PRIVATE
ACTIONS
Plaintiffs prevail in private actions under the CPA only when they can
show causation.43 Since Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco
Title Insurance Co.,44 the Washington State Supreme Court has held that
plaintiffs must show that the deceptive act proximately caused their
injuries.45 Proximate cause requires plaintiffs to show both cause in fact
and legal causation.46  Generally, a plaintiff in an affirmative
misrepresentation case may prove cause in fact in one of three ways:
affirmative proof of reliance,47  an inference of causation from a
deceptive act,48  or a rebuttable presumption of reliance.49  The
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 19.86.090. A plaintiff may sue only if he or she has been injured "in his or her business
or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020." Id. (emphasis added); see also Hangman Ridge
Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 793, 719 P.2d 531, 539 (1986)
(holding that plaintiffs must show a "causal link ... between the unfair or deceptive acts and the
injury suffered by plaintiffs").
44. 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
45. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n. v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 314, 858 P.2d
1054, 1062 (1993) (interpreting Hangman Ridge to require that the jury find that the unfair or
deceptive act was a proximate cause of the injury suffered).
46. Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77, 82 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 110-11, 639 P.2d 832, 840 (1982) (holding that
a party has not established a causal relationship with a misrepresentation of fact where the party
does not convince the trier of fact that he or she relied on it); see also Zekman v. Direct Am.
Marketers, 675 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the concept of reliance is
"ambiguously present within the parameters of the concept of proximate cause"). The Nuttall
court's approach to the causation requirement is identical to that of a common law deceit action. See
PROSSER, supra note 7, at 685-86. At common law, reliance is the behavior that provides evidence
that a misrepresentation or nondisclosure "induce[d] the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
action .... PROSSER, supra note 7, at 685-86. Similarly, in a case for "fraud in the inducement," a
plaintiff must show reliance. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (8th ed. 2004).
48. See, e.g., Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699, 702-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that reliance and damages were sufficiently shown by the fact that passengers parted
with money for what should have been a "pass-through" port charge, but the cruise line kept the
money).
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Washington State Supreme Court has not yet decided which level of
proof is necessary to demonstrate cause in fact in a private action
brought under the CPA.50
A. The Hangman Ridge Court Held that the CPA Requires Proof of a
Causal Link Between the Unfair or Deceptive Act and the Injury
The Hangman Ridge court concluded that causation is one of the five
elements necessary to maintain a CPA claim. 51 The plaintiffs tried to
show that an escrow agent had caused their injuries by offering proof
that the agent had failed to advise them to get individual counsel and to
explain the detrimental tax consequences of a real estate transaction.52
49. The United States Supreme Court adopted a rebuttable presumption of reliance in securities
nondisclosure cases in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972). The
Court recognized that unfair or deceptive practices can create a "fraud on the market" phenomenon
in which omissions or misrepresentations artificially inflate the market price of a stock. Id. at 153;
see also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit stated:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific false representation, or
may not directly rely on it; he may purchase because of a favorable price trend, price earnings
ratio, or some other factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition that the market
price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and
thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price-whether he is
aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof
from each purchaser that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing would defeat
recovery by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the causational chain is
broken only if the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known of the
misrepresentation. We decline to leave such open market purchasers unprotected.
Id.
Washington courts allow a rebuttable presumption of causation in securities fraud cases and
Franchise Investment Protection Act cases on a showing that a deceptive omission was material to
the consumer's decision to purchase a product or security. See, e.g., Morris v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 107
Wash. 2d 314, 328-31, 729 P.2d 33, 40-42 (1986) (applying the Franchise Investment Protection
Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100 (2004)); Guarino v. Interactive Objects, Inc., 122 Wash. App. 95,
114-23, 86 P.3d 1175, 1185-90 (2004) (applying the Securities Act of Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20 (2004)). The rationale behind the materiality test for omissions is that it is virtually
impossible to prove reliance in cases in which the plaintiff alleges nondisclosure of material
misrepresentations. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
88 HARV. L. REv. 584, 590 (1975) [hereinafter Reliance]. Requiring proof of reliance in such cases
would require plaintiffs to prove reliance "on the negative" and thus would require them to
demonstrate that they had in mind the converse of the omitted acts. See id.
50. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Lines-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 196-97, 35 P.3d 351, 360
(2001).
51. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 784-85,
719 P.2d 531, 535 (1986). A CPA claim requires: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2)
occurring in the conduct of trade or commerce, (3) affecting the public interest, (4) injuring the
plaintiff in his or her business or property, and (5) caused by the defendant. Id.
52. See id. at 781,719 P.2d at 533.
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The court determined that the link between the failure to advise the
plaintiffs to seek tax advice and the actual detrimental tax consequences
was "too tenuous" to establish causation.53
The Hangman Ridge court held only that the CPA requires causation;
the court did not provide a standard for proving causation.54 To support
its holding, the court cited six decisions that discussed the CPA's
causation element. While all six opinions cited in Hangman Ridge
stated that the CPA requires proof of causation,56 only Nuttall v.
Dowel 5 7 directly addressed the reliance issue.58 In Nuttall, the court of
appeals held that "a party has not established a causal relationship with a
misrepresentation of fact where he does not convince the trier of fact that
he relied upon it.'' 59 Distinguishing private causes of action from CPA
actions brought by the Washington State Attorney General on behalf of
all consumers,6° the Nuttall court reasoned that a stricter standard for
proof of cause in fact is necessary in private actions because the public
interest is less compelling.
6
'
The Nuttall court acknowledged that federal courts use a more lenient
standard for causation in cases brought under federal consumer
53. Id. at 795, 719 P.2d at 540. According to the court, the plaintiffs did not show that, had they
been advised, they would have sought counsel from a tax attorney and heeded the attorney's advice.
Id. Moreover, substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the plaintiffs could not
have avoided the tax liability with or without the advice of a tax attorney. Id. Because tax liability
was inevitable, it "could not have been caused by the acts of the closing agent." Id.
54. See id. at 792-93, 719 P.2d at 539.
55. Id. at 792-93, 719 P.2d at 540 (citing Smith v. Olympic Bank, 103 Wash. 2d 418, 425, 693 P.2d
92, 96 (1985); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 418, 693 P.2d 697, 702
(1985); Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wash. 2d 40, 46, 614 P.2d 184, 188 (1980); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Updegrave, 33 Wash. App. 653, 663, 656 P.2d 1130, 1136 (1983) (Roe, C.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 110-11, 639 P.2d 832, 840 (1982);
Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wash. App. 359, 368, 623 P.2d 710, 716 (1981)).
56. See Smith, 103 Wash. 2d at 425, 693 P.2d at 96; Transamerica Title, 103 Wash. 2d at 418, 693
P.2d at 702; Anhold, 94 Wash. 2d at 46, 614 P.2d at 188; St. Paul Fire & Marine, 33 Wash. App. at
663, 656 P.2d at 1136 (Roe, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Nuttall, 31 Wash. App. at
110-11, 639 P.2d at 840; Lidstrand, 28 Wash. App. at 368, 623 P.2d at 716.
57. 31 Wash. App. 98, 639 P.2d 832 (1982).
58. Id. at 110-11,639 P.2d at 840.
59. Id. at 111, 639 P.2d at 840. In Nuttall, the plaintiff was a purchaser of real estate who had
accused the real estate agent/seller of misrepresenting the boundary lines of the property. Id. at 104,
639 P.2d at 836-37. Nuttall purchased the property and constructed an easement road in reliance on
the seller's representations only to find that the true property line placed the road wholly on his
neighbor's property. See id. at 101-03,639 P.2d at 835-36.
60. See id. at 110, 639 P.2d at 840.
61. See id.
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protection statutes. 62 The court reasoned that this lesser burden was
justified at the federal level because of the public policies that the federal
statutes serve. 63 Because Congress enacted the federal consumer
protection statutes in order to "induce private persons to act as enforcing
agents," the court reasoned that these statutes do not require persons
suing for damages to offer strict proof of individual reliance.
64
B. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Held that the CPA
Requires Proof of Proximate Causation
Since its decision in Hangman Ridge, the Washington State Supreme
Court has expanded its analysis of the causation requirement.65 In
Washington State Physicians Insurance & Exchange Ass'n v. Fisons
Corp. 66 the court held that the causation element of the CPA requires a
finding of proximate cause.67 Proximate cause requires proof of two
elements: cause in fact and legal cause.68
To prove "cause in fact," the plaintiff must show that "but for" the
deceptive act or practice his or her injury would not have occurred.6 9
Proof of cause in fact thus requires constructing a counterfactual. 70 For
example, but for the real estate agent in Nuttall telling the plaintiff that
the property was ten acres, the plaintiff would not have bought the
property.71 Proof of cause in fact is usually a question for the trier of
fact.72 Sometimes, however, cause in fact may be a question of law.73
The kind of proof required to show cause in fact will vary depending
upon the type of unfair or deceptive practice addressed in the litigation.74
62. See id. at 111,639 P.2d at 840.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 314,
858 P.2d 1054, 1062 (1993) (holding that proof of causation under the CPA requires proof of
proximate cause).
66. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
67. See id. at 314, 858 P.2d at 1062.
68. Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77, 82 (1985).
69. See City of Seattle v. Blume, 134 Wash. 2d 243, 251-52, 947 P.2d 223, 227 (1997).
70. See Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 339, 345
(1992).
71. See generally Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 639 P.2d 832 (1982).
72. Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 778, 698 P.2d at 83.
73. See Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 142, 727 P.2d 655,664 (1986).
74. Different kinds of deceptive acts "cause" injury in different ways. A misrepresentation, for
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In addition to showing cause in fact, a claimant must prove legal
cause. When determining legal cause, a court asks "whether liability
should attach as a matter of law given the existence of cause in fact., 75
The court thus determines, based on policy considerations, "how far the
consequences of defendant's acts should extend., 76 To prove legal cause,
a plaintiff must convince the court that logic, common sense, justice,
policy, or precedent demands that the defendant be found liable for the
consequences of his or her actions.77
C. In an Affirmative Misrepresentation Case, There Are Three Ways
of Proving Cause in Fact
In inducement cases, courts have accepted three methods of proving
cause in fact. Some courts have required affirmative proof that the
plaintiff knew about the statement and relied upon it. 78 Other courts have
allowed the jury to infer causation from proof of a deceptive act and an
injury.79 Still other courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption of
reliance on proof of materiality.8 ° If the plaintiff proves that the
example, must induce purchase to cause an injury: See Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 85
Wash. 2d 637, 643, 538 P.2d 510, 515 (1975). However, some deceptive conduct in trade or
commerce does not induce a sale. See, e.g., Salois v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355,
359-60, 581 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1978) (holding that an insurer's actions, in breaching its duty of good
faith and fair dealing by refusing to pay insureds' claim for benefits, were unlawful and against
public policy, and thus constituted a per se "unfair trade practice" within the ambit of the CPA). In
Salois, the insurance company caused the harm by depriving the insureds of benefits; it did not
induce a person to purchase an insurance policy. Id.
75. Hartley, 103 Wash. 2d at 779, 698 P.2d at 83 (emphasis omitted).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 110-11, 639 P.2d 832, 840 (1982) (holding that
a party has not established a causal relationship with a misrepresentation of fact where he does not
convince the trier of fact that he relied on it); see also Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, 675 N.E.2d
994, 998 (I11. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the concept of reliance is "ambiguously present within
the parameters of the concept of proximate cause").
79. See, e.g., Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699, 702-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that reliance and damages were sufficiently shown by the fact that passengers parted
with money for what should have been a "pass-through" port charge, but the cruise line kept the
money).
80. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (adopting a rebuttable
presumption of reliance in omissions cases); see also Morris v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 107 Wash. 2d 314,
328-31, 729 P.2d 33, 40-42 (1986) (applying the Franchise Investment Protection Act, WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.100 (2004)); Guarino v. Interactive Objects, Inc., 122 Wash. App. 95, 114-23, 86 P.3d
1175, 1185-90 (2004) (applying the Securities Act of Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20
(2004)).
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misrepresentation was material, then the court will presume reliance.
unless the defendant can produce evidence in rebuttal.81
D. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Not Decided What
Proof Is Required to Show Cause in Fact in Inducement Cases
Under the CPA
Washington courts dispute whether the CPA requires proof of
reliance to show cause in fact in affirmative misrepresentation actions.82
In 2001, the Washington State Supreme Court addressed the
disagreement in Pickett v. Holland America Line-Westours, Inc. 83 In
Pickett, a group of cruise ticket purchasers sued the cruise ship line for a
violation of the CPA.84 The plaintiffs accused Holland America of
representing that "port charges and taxes" were mandatory government
fees, when in fact Holland used the fees for other purposes.85 The trial
court denied the group's motion for class certification and conditionally
approved a settlement negotiated between the plaintiffs and Holland
America.86 An objecting passenger intervened and sought court
disapproval of the settlement.87 Despite the objections, the trial court
81. See Morris, 107 Wash. 2d at 330, 729 P.2d at 42; see also KARL B. TEGLAND, 5 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE LAW & PRACTICE § 301.8 (4th ed. 2004). The procedural effect of a
defendant's rebuttal is unclear under Washington law. The Washington State Supreme Court has
acknowledged several types of presumptions. State v. Johnson, 100 Wash. 2d 607, 615, 674 P.2d
145, 151 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bergeron, 105 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 711 P.2d
1000, 1005 (1985). The court stated:
There are four basic types of presumptions .... The first is the "conclusive" presumption,
which requires the trier of fact to infer some fact from some supporting fact. The second type
of presumption is the "persuasion-shifting" presumption, which shifts the burden of persuasion
and requires the trier of fact to draw a certain inference unless the defendant proves otherwise
by some specified quantum of evidence, usually a preponderance of the evidence. The third
type of presumption is the "production-shifting" presumption, which does not alter the burden
of persuasion but does not require the trier of fact to draw a certain inference unless the
defendant produces some evidence to the contrary. Each of these first three types of
presumptions is "mandatory" in that the trier of fact is required in at least some cases to draw
the inference. In contrast, the fourth type of presumption, the "permissive inference," never
requires, but only permits, the trier of fact to draw the inference.
Id. While federal courts have adopted a "production-shifting" presumption, Washington courts have
neither adopted nor recommended this rule. See FED. R. EVID. 301; TEGLAND, supra, § 301.8.
82. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 196-97, 35 P.3d 351, 360
(2001).
83. 145 Wash. 2d 178, 35 P.3d 351 (2001).
84. See id. at 182, 35 P.3d at 353.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id.
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approved the settlement, finding that it was "fair, adequate, and
reasonable." 88 Divison I of the Washington State Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's approval of the settlement.89 In turn, the
Washington State Supreme Court reversed the decision and reinstated
the settlement. 90
At issue in the case was whether the settlement was "fair, adequate,
and reasonable." 9' To determine whether a settlement is "fair, adequate,
and reasonable," a court looks at a number of factors, including the
possibility of the class's success at trial.92 The trial court found that the
class faced insurmountable difficulties at trial because the class would
have to prove individual reliance for each plaintiff.93 Division I, on the
other hand, held that a party could satisfy the causation prong of the
Hangman Ridge test by showing only that he or she lost money because
of unlawful conduct.94 Thus, Division I adopted a test for cause in fact
that allows an inference of causation from proof of the deceptive act and
proof of injury.95
In drawing this conclusion, Division I relied on two Washington
cases:96 Edmonds v. John L. Scott Real Estate, Inc.,97 and Mason v.
Mortgage America, Inc.98 The court also relied on several out-of-state
cases to support its holding. 99 In Amato v. General Motors Corp.,100 for
88. Id.
89. Id. at 182-83, 35 P.3d at 353.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 188, 35 P.3d at 356.
92. See id. at 192, 35 P.3d at 358.
93. See id. at 196, 35 P.3d at 360.
94. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc, 101 Wash. App. 901, 916, 6 P.3d 63, 70 (2000).
95. See id. at 920, 6 P.3d at 72.
96. Id. at 916, 6 P.3d at 70; see also Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 842, 854, 792
P.2d 142, 148 (1990) (holding that a claimant meets the injury element of a CPA claim if the
consumer's property interest or money is diminished because of unlawful conduct); Edmonds v.
John L. Scott Real Estate, Inc., 87 Wash. App. 834, 847, 942 P.2d 1072, 1079 (1997) (holding that
injury and causation are established under the CPA if the plaintiff loses money because of unlawful
conduct).
97. 87 Wash. App. 834, 942 P.2d 1072 (1997).
98. 114 Wash. 2d 842, 792 P.2d 142 (1990).
99. See Pickett, 101 Wash. App. at 917-19, 6 P.3d at 71-72; see also Latman v. Costa Cruise Line,
N.V., 758 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that reliance and damages were
sufficiently shown by the fact that people. parted with their money); Dix v. Am. Bankers Life
Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 1987) (holding that members of a class proceeding
under the Consumer Protection Act need not individually prove reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations); Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 N.E.2d 625, 629-31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
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example, the Ohio State Court of Appeals refused to require reliance in a
consumer class action because such a requirement "would result in the
utter negation of the fundamental objectives of class-action
procedure."'' 1 Division I found these cases persuasive'0 2 and held that
Holland America "[could not] impose on passengers fees, which are not
port charges and taxes, and yet call them government charges, taxes, and
fees.' 1 3 The court also held that the Washington CPA "should be
liberally construed to protect the public and foster honest
competition."'
0 4
The Washington State Supreme Court rejected Division I's
analysis. 10 5 According to the Supreme Court, neither of the two
Washington cases cited by Division I were appropriate. 0 6 In Edmonds,
the plaintiff had relied on the defendant's representations. 1 7 In Mason,
the issue of causation never arose because the court's discussion was
limited to injury. 1 8 The Washington State Supreme Court, refusing to
accept the out-of-state cases, 09 noted that the only Washington authority
"directly on point" was Nuttall v. Dowell, which had found that the CPA
requires reliance." 0 The court concluded that "it is enough to say that
this is a debatable question without a clear answer under Washington
law.""' Because the court needed to find only that the plaintiffs faced an
uncertain outcome at trial, it did not need to decide how to prove
reliance." 1
2
(adopting a rebuttable presumption of reliance in misrepresentation class action cases).
100. 463 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
101. Id. at 628.
102. Pickett, 101 Wash. App. at 918-20, 6 P.3d at 71-72.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 197, 35 P.3d 351, 360
(2001).
106. Id.
107. Id. (summarizing Edmonds v. John L. Scott Real Estate, Inc., 87 Wash. App. 834, 841-42, 942
P.2d 1072, 1076-77 (1997)).
108. Id. (summarizing Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 842, 854, 792 P.2d 142, 148
(1990)).
109. Id. at 196-97, 35 P.3d at 360.
110. Id.; see also Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 110-11, 639 P.2d 832, 840 (1982) (holding
that in a private cause of action for damages under the CPA a plaintiff must convince the trier of
fact that he relied on a vendor's misrepresentation).
111. Pickett, 145 Wash. 2d at 197, 35 P.3d at 360.
112. See id.
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After Pickett, it is thus unclear what kind of proof a CPA plaintiff
must present to show cause in fact in a case in which an unfair or
deceptive act has induced consumers to act to their detriment.'13 The
CPA requires parties to show that the inducement was a cause in fact of
their injuries, 1 4 and the behavior that normally evidences such an
occurrence is reliance.' 1 5 However, Washington courts have not decided
whether to require plaintiffs to prove reliance affirmatively, to allow an
inference of cause in fact, or to create a rebuttable presumption of
reliance on proof of materiality."
6
III. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE ADOPTED A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE IN DISCLOSURE AND
NONDISCLOSURE CASES
While Washington courts have not determined the level of proof
required to show cause in fact in affirmative misrepresentation cases
under the CPA,"i7 many federal courts have adopted the rebuttable
presumption of reliance standard in consumer protection actions brought
under Sections 13 and 19 of the FTCA. 118 Sections 13(b) and 19 of the
FTCA authorize the FTC to bring actions for redress on behalf of groups
of consumers harmed by violations of the FTCA's prohibition against
unfair or deceptive acts." 9 In Federal Trade Commission v. Figgie
113. See id.
114. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 314, 858
P.2d 1054, 1062 (1993).
115. See Nuttall, 31 Wash. App. at 111, 639 P.2d at 840.
116. Pickett, 145 Wash. 2d at 197, 35 P.3d at 360 (noting that whether the CPA requires reliance is
a debatable question under Washington law).
117. Id.
118. The following courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption of reliance in consumer protection
cases: McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1388 (1 1th Cir. 2000); FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994
F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316
(8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. 1263523 Ontario, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); FTC v.
Gill, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1185-86 (C.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v. Int'l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,709 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
119. See Federal Trade Commission Act, § 19, tit. II, § 206(a), Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183,
2201 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)-(b) (2000)) (authorizing the FTC to bring
an action on behalf of injured consumers for any relief the court finds necessary to redress injury to
consumers resulting from deceptive acts or practices); see also Federal Trade Commission Act, §
13(b), tit. IV, § 408(0, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576, 592 (1973) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000)) (authorizing the monetary equivalent of recission). Not all violations of 15
U.S.C. § 45 qualify for treatment under these sections. To qualify for a redress action, the FTC must
prove that a reasonable person should have known that the alleged misrepresentation would
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International, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted an evidentiary standard for
determining when a court can presume reliance in an action by the FTC
under these sections of the FTCA.120 The Figgie International court
determined that a rebuttable presumption of reliance in affirmative
misrepresentation cases exists if (1) the misrepresentation is material, (2)
the misrepresentation is widely disseminated, and (3) there is proof that
the claimant bought the product.
121
A. Evidence that an Affirmative Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure
Is Material Supports a Presumption of Reliance
The first element of the Figgie International test requires a material
misrepresentation. 122 The Figgie International materiality test is similar
to the materiality standard used by courts in securities fraud actions
under Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5. 23 In
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,124 the United States Supreme
Court held that in a nondisclosure case under Rule 1Ob-5, "positive proof
of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery."'125 Like the CPA, Rule
lOb-5 prohibits deceptive acts designed to induce people to make a
deceptively induce a consumer to act to his or her detriment. See Figgie Int 'l, 994 F.2d at 603. The
court commented:
Figgie correctly argues that the Commission's findings describing an "unfair or deceptive"
trade practice under Section 5 do not necessarily describe a "dishonest or fraudulent" one
under Section 19. Section 19 liability must not be a rubber stamp of Section 5 liability. Figgie
appears to argue, however, that the Commission's findings alone can never be the basis of
Section 19 liability. We disagree. When the findings of the Commission in respect to the
defendant's practices are such that a reasonable person would know that the defendant's
practices were dishonest or fraudulent, the district need not engage in further fact finding other
than to make the ultimate determination that a reasonable person would know. This is such a
case.
Id. In Figgie International, the court held that the FTC satisfied this threshold requirement by
showing that the defendant "misled customers about 'the single most useful piece of information'
they could have used." See id.
120. See Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 605; see also Gill, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (applying the Figgie
Int'l test in an action brought under Section 13(b) and holding that proof of reliance by each
individual consumer is not necessary under the FTCA). The Figgie International court held that a
rebuttable presumption of causation is appropriate under both Section 19, which authorizes
monetary damage awards to consumers, and Section 13, which limits the remedy to injunctive
relief. Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 603.
121. See Figgie Int ', 994 F.2d at 605-06.
122. See id. at 605.
123. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1 0b-5 (2004).
124. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
125. Id.
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purchase. 126 Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud in connection with securities transactions. 127 In Ute Citizens, the
Court held that the "obligation to disclose and the withholding of a
material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact."' 28
While the Ute Citizens Court limited its holding to omissions cases,
the Ninth Circuit adopted a similar rule in Figgie International, a case
brought under the FTCA in which an affirmative misrepresentation
fraudulently induced consumers to act to their detriment. 29 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that, as in omissions cases, evidence that a
misrepresentation is material also supports a presumption of reliance. 130
If an affirmative misrepresentation or omission is "material," then it is
likely that a reasonable person relied upon it in making his or her
decision to purchase the product.' 3' For example, in Figgie International
the defendant represented to consumers that its heat detector product was
a reliable life-saving fire warning device. 132 Using the Figgie
International test, the court could presume reliance if the FTC showed
that the reliability of heat detectors as life-saving fire warning devices
was material to a reasonable person's purchase.133
B. Evidence that a Business Widely Disseminated a Material
Misrepresentation Is Evidence of Reliance
The second element of the Figgie International test requires wide
dissemination of the misrepresentation. 134 Like materiality, evidence of
wide dissemination is evidence of reliance. 35 If a misrepresentation is
widely disseminated, it is more likely that the business intended the
126. See id. at 151.
127. See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
128. Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 154.
129. FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cit. 1993).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 605.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 605-06.
135. See FTC v. Int'l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,709 (N.D. Cal.
1983); see also FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (D. Minn. 1985) (adopting a
rebuttable presumption of reliance in a case brought under section 13 of the FTCA on proof that the
alleged fraudulent practices were the type of misrepresentation on which a reasonably prudent
person would rely, that they were widely disseminated, and that the injured consumers actually
purchased the product).
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misrepresentation to induce customers to buy a product. 136 An intention
to induce is also strong circumstantial evidence that the customer relied
on the misrepresentation. 37 As one court held, "where numerous
consumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by the same seller,
proof of the prevalence of the practice would provide proof to all."
138
C. Evidence that the Consumer Bought a Product that Was the
Subject of a Material, Widely Disseminated Misrepresentation Is
Evidence that the Consumer Relied on the Misrepresentation
The final element of the Figgie International test requires the plaintiff
to provide evidence that consumers have bought the product.
39
Evidence of purchase is not direct evidence that the consumer knew
about the misrepresentation or relied upon it, but is instead indirect
evidence of the consumer's reliance.14
0
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's three-prong test describes the type of
evidence that will establish causation in an affirmative misrepresentation
case.' 41 Once a plaintiff provides evidence of materiality, wide
dissemination, and purchase, the court presumes reliance. 142 A defendant
then may rebut the presumption by providing evidence that the consumer
did not rely. 43 Because Congress intended Sections 13 and 19 to serve a
public purpose by authorizing the FTC to seek redress on behalf of
136. See Int'l Diamond, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,709.
137. See id.
138. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808 (1971) (holding that individual proof of reliance
is not necessary in a class action fraud claim seeking rescission of installment contracts); see also
Int'l Diamond, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,709 (citing Vasquez in a case brought under section
13 of the FTCA).
139. See Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 605-06.
140. See FTC v. 1263523 Ontario, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the
kind of evidence sufficient to establish a presumption).
141. See Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 605-06.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 606. The Figgie International opinion is unclear about the precise procedural effect
of rebutting the presumption. Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides that a presumption merely
shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant, but does not shift the burden of
persuasion. FED. R. EVID. 301. At the federal level, then, a plaintiff establishes an element of his or
her claim by producing evidence of the basic fact (in this case, materiality, wide dissemination, and
product purchase). If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict. In Figgie International, the defendant failed to rebut the presumption, and thus the court did
not reach the question of what would happen procedurally if a defendant rebuts the presumption.
Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 606.
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consumers, the presumption is justified. 144 The test is grounded in the
idea that the party guilty of wrongdoing should bear the risk resulting
from his or her acts. 145
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE FIGGIE
INTERNATIONAL TEST
Washington should adopt the Figgie International court's approach to
show cause in fact in CPA affirmative misrepresentation cases. Where a
defendant has deceived a large number of consumers through an
affirmative misrepresentation, courts should presume reliance if the
claimants can show that the misrepresentation was material and that they
bought the product. Courts then should allow the defendant to rebut the
presumption by showing that the consumers did not rely on the
misrepresentation.1 46 There are three reasons for adopting the Figgie
International test. First, the test honors the legislature's intent that courts
construe the statute in accordance with federal law. 147 Second, the test
furthers the legislature's intent that courts broadly construe the statute to
protect consumers. 148 Finally, the test does not unfairly burden trade and
commerce and thus complies with the statute's requirements. 1
49
A. A Rebuttable Presumption of Causation Honors Legislative Intent
by Creating Consistency Between State and Federal Law
One purpose of the CPA is to complement federal law. 50 The
144. See FTC v. Int'l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,709 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (noting that Sections 13 and 19b of the FTC Improvement Act "serve a public purpose by
authorizing the Commission to seek redress on behalf of injured consumers. It would be inconsistent
with that statutory purpose for the court to stifle effective prosecution of large consumer redress
actions by requiring proof of subjective reliance by each individual consumer."); see also FTC v.
Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (D. Minn. 1985) (adopting the approach of the
International Diamond Corp. court).
145. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
146. The question of the procedural effect of the presumption on the proceedings is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Washington courts have not taken a uniform approach to the law of
presumptions. See supra note 81. Because the law is not clear on this issue, each court must decide
as a matter of policy what effect to give the presumption and the kind of evidence required to rebut
it.
147. See infra Part W.A.
148. See infra Part IV.B.
149. See infra Part IV.C.
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
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legislature expressly declared that the final decisions of federal courts
and final orders of the FTC should guide Washington State courts. 151
The legislature authorized private causes of action to further this
purpose.152 State courts have also looked to federal law in the past to
resolve disputed issues of law under the CPA. 53 Therefore, it is
appropriate to look to federal standards when determining the amount
and kinds of evidence required by the statute to prove causation.
Adopting the Ninth Circuit's test creates a consistent approach to
proving causation under state and federal law. Businesses are subject to
both federal and state law. The FTC can sue in federal court to deter
businesses from engaging in unfair or deceptive business practices,
154
and the Washington State attorney general and private citizens can sue in
state court for the same reason. 55 The Washington State Court of
Appeals has stated that the legislature wished state courts to look to
federal law in order to create consistency and avoid exposing businesses
to two different sets of rules for liability.156 Adopting the federal
rebuttable presumption of causation furthers this goal because it creates
a uniform rule for causation in state and federal courts. 57
The CPA does not require state courts to follow federal rules.' 58 If
federal rules conflict with established state precedent, then state courts
may decline to follow federal rules. 159 In this case, however, no state rule
requires affirmative evidence of reliance to prove cause in fact. As the
Washington State Supreme Court concluded in Pickett, the only case
"directly on point" on this issue is Nuttall v. Dowell, in which the court
held that individuals must prove reliance to prevail in a private cause of
action under the CPA.'
60
151. Id.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2004).
153. See, e.g., Blewett v. Abbott Labs., 86 Wash. App. 782, 788, 938 P.2d 842, 846 (1997)
(applying federal law in an antitrust action brought under the CPA).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000) (allowing suits by FTC for injunctive relief); id. § 57(b) (allowing
suits by FTC for damages).
155. WASH REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2004); id. § 19.86.090.
156. See Blewett, 86 Wash. App. at 788, 938 P.2d at 846.
157. See id. ("In directing courts to be 'guided by' federal law, the Legislature presumably intended
to minimize conflict between the enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws and to avoid
subjecting Washington businesses to divergent regulatory approaches to the same conduct.").
158. See id. at 787-88, 938 P.2d at 846.
159. See id.
160. Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 197, 35 P.3d 351, 360 (2001)
(citing Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, PP, 639 P.2d 832, PP (1982)).
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The Nuttall court, however, did not reach the question of whether
proof of materiality and wide dissemination may establish a rebuttable
presumption of reliance. 61 The Nuttall court merely held that the CPA
requires proof of reliance.' 62 Yet evidence of materiality is strong
evidence that consumers relied on the misrepresentation in their decision
to purchase a product. 163 As one commentator noted, the materiality test
does not "abolish the causation requirement"; instead, it establishes "an
alternative means of proving 'the requisite element of causation in fact'
in appropriate cases."
' 64
Moreover, in Nuttall, federal consumer protection statutes were not
relevant authority for the standard of proof of causation because they do
not authorize private causes of action. 165 The Nuttall court suggested that
the standard of proof required under the federal statutes was less
stringent "in recognition of the importance of the public policy that the
federal statutes seek to serve and the desire to induce private persons to
act as enforcing agents."' 166 Given these differences, state courts might
be reluctant to import federal standards into cases involving private
actions under the CPA.
However, the differences between actions brought by the FTC and
those brought by private individuals are minimal when the FTC sues on
behalf of consumers.1 67 In such cases, courts may "grant such relief
as... necessary to redress injury to consumers" that resulted from
dishonest or fraudulent trade practices. 168 The FTC must show causation
when suing for sanctions under 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).1 69 In Figgie
International, the court established an appropriate standard for
determining what evidence sufficiently shows causation. 70 There is no
reason for state courts not to adopt this standard in similar cases.
71
161. Nuttall, 31 Wash. App. at 110-11,639 P.2d at 840.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Reliance, supra note 49, at 588.
165. See Nuttall, 31 Wash. App. at 110-11,639 P.2d at 840.
166. Id. at 111,639 P.2d at 840.
167. See McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1388 (11 th Cir. 2000).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2000).
169. Id.; see McGregor, 206 F.3d at 1388.
170. See FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993).
171. One could argue that an action brought under Sections 13 and 19 of the FTCA is different from
one brought under the CPA because the FTCA sections require a showing that the unfair or
deceptive practice was dishonest or fraudulent. See id. at 603. Given the Figgie court's
interpretation of this threshold requirement, however, a court should find that any material
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The Nuttall court's analysis also fails to consider that plaintiffs must
establish a public interest in order to prevail under the CPA. 172 There is
no evidence that the public interest is less compelling when the FTC
sues than when a private actor sues to enforce a provision of the CPA.
The fact that the legislature established the private cause of action to
induce private citizens to help enforce the statute further supports the
contention that a major purpose of private actions underthe CPA is to
protect the interests of consumers generally. 173 Therefore, there is no
reason for state courts to adopt a stricter standard of proof than federal
courts. To do so would thwart the intent of the legislature to complement
federal law and to use the holdings of federal courts as guidance for
construing the CPA's language. 
174
Washington courts thus should adopt the Ninth Circuit's approach.
The CPA expressly advises courts to look to federal case law when
interpreting the CPA.1 75 Adopting a rebuttable presumption of reliance
does not conflict with established state law, but instead establishes a test
that preserves the intent of the CPA. 1
76
B. Adopting the Figgie International Test Promotes the Legislature's
Intent by Protecting Consumers
The legislature established a private cause of action under the CPA in
order to protect consumers. 177 Private actors may bring private suits that
are in the public interest. 78 While private claimants must prove cause in
misrepresentation also is dishonest or fraudulent. See id. In Figgie International, the court held that
a practice was dishonest or fraudulent if the practice "misled customers about 'the single most
useful piece of information' they could have used." Id. Moreover, the Figgie International court
held that a rebuttable presumption of causation is necessary so that the purposes of an action for
damages are not thwarted by a standard of causation that is too strict. See id. at 605. The Figgie
International court did not hold that the more lenient causation standard is justified because of the
requirement that the misrepresentation be "dishonest or fraudulent." See id.
172. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 787,
719 P.2d 531, 536 (1986).
173. Id. at 784, 719 P.2d at 535. Thus, the Nuttall court failed to distinguish federal actions from
state actions on the basis that "the federal statutes seek to induce private persons to act as enforcing
agents." Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wash. App. 98, 111, 639 P.2d 832, 840 (1982). The Washington
State Legislature also intended the CPA to enlist private persons as enforcing agents. See id.
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
175. Id.
176. See supra Part I.C; infra Part IV.B.
177. See supra Part I.C.
178. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 787,
719 P.2d 531, 536 (1986).
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fact to maintain a CPA claim, 79 a strict reliance requirement runs
counter to the interests of consumers and thus counter to the intent of the
legislature.180 First, requiring affirmative proof of reliance would not
allow consumers whose reliance was indirect to recover under the
statute. 181 The rule thus creates an "unreasonable and irrelevant
evidentiary burden."' 82 Second, placing the burden of proof on the party
that has committed the deceptive act or practice makes it easier for
consumers to maintain a private cause of action.'83 The Figgie
International test thus protects the interests of the consumers, and
adopting the test would further the goal of protecting consumers. 
84
C. Adopting the Federal Test Would Not Unreasonably Restrain
Trade
Adopting the Figgie International test would not unreasonably burden
defendants or unreasonably constrain trade because it allows defendants
to rebut the presumption of causation. 185 The CPA specifically limits the
lengths to which courts may go in order to protect consumers. 86 Courts
cannot "prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the
.... ,,187
development and preservation of business. By allowing defendants to
rebut the presumption of reliance, the Figgie International test allows
defendants to avoid liability for those practices that do not actually
induce reliance. 88 The defendant can simply show that the plaintiff did
not rely on the misrepresentation to his or her detriment. 89 The rule thus
does not impose liability for those harms caused by something other than
179. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 312, 858
P.2d 1054, 1061 (1993).
180. See FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a strict
reliance requirement runs counter to the intent of a statute designed to protect the interests of
consumers).
181. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).
182. Id.
183. See FTC v. Int'l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,709 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (implying that effective prosecution of large consumer redress actions "would be stifled" if
courts required proof of subjective reliance by each individual consumer).
184. See Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 605.
185. Id. at 606.
186. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2004).
187. Id.
188. See Reliance, supra note 49, at 598.
189. See Reliance, supra note 49, at 598.
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the unfair or deceptive act. 190
For example, it is possible that in Pickett some consumers might not
have read the advertising and cruise contract clauses that attributed part
of the cruise cost to "port charges and taxes."'19 1 The rebuttable
presumption would allow defendants the opportunity to offer proof that
the consumers did not rely on the misrepresentations. 92 For example,
the defendants in Pickett might have offered evidence that they sent a
letter to each purchaser that communicated a correction to the
misleading statements and that the consumers bought the tickets anyway.
The rebuttable presumption thus preserves the reliance element, but
places the burden of proving reliance on the party who allegedly has
violated the CPA.1
93
Adopting the Figgie International test thus would not unreasonably
restrain trade. A rebuttable presumption of causation protects defendants
by preserving the CPA's causation requirement, 94 but also lessens the
evidentiary burden on the injured consumer.' 95 By forcing the defendant
to rebut the plaintiffs' evidence of reliance, the burden of production
rightfully falls on the party who has committed the deceptive act.
196
V. CONCLUSION
Washington courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption of reliance.
Neither the language of the CPA nor case law interpreting it requires
strict proof of reliance. The legislature intended that the statute be
liberally construed to protect consumers. By adopting the Figgie
International test for proving reliance, Washington courts would honor
the intent of the CPA by creating consistency between state and federal
law and by promoting the interests of consumers. Moreover, the Figgie
International test appropriately puts the burden of proving causation on
190. See Reliance, supra note 49, at 598.
191. See Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 145 Wash. 2d 178, 183-84, 35 P.3d 351, 353-
54 (2001).
192. FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595,605-06 (9th Cir. 1993).
193. See Morris v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 107 Wash. 2d 314, 329, 729 P.2d 33, 41 (1986) ("[S]ince it is
the defendant's nondisclosure that has made proof difficult, it is proper to require the defendant to
bear such difficulties.")
194. See Reliance, supra note 49, at 598.
195. See Morris, 107 Wash. 2d at 329, 729 P.2d at 41.
196. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946).
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the party that has allegedly committed a deceptive act in trade or
commerce.
270
